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In this paper, we present a new definition of Byzantine consensus that applies to blockchains, applications that allow to
transfer digital assets through transactions. More precisely, a blockchain is a distributed abstraction where participants
must reach a consensus on a unique block of transactions to be appended to the chain. This new consensus definition
requires a validity property based on an application-specific predicate but does not require a decided value to be pro-
posed as long as it is valid. Its novelty is to allow to reach consensus on a value even if this value was proposed only
by Byzantine processes, provided that it is considered valid by the application. The advantage of differentiating the
validation of a proposed value and the nature of the proposing participant is to make the system progress by appending
blocks with transactions, where other algorithms would typically abort.
Mots-clefs : asynchrony
1 Introduction
Blockchain, as originally coined in the seminal Bitcoin paper [13], is a promising technology to track
ownerships of digital assets within a distributed ledger. This technology aims at allowing processes to
agree on a series of consecutive blocks of transactions that may invoke contract functions to exchange
these assets. While the first instances of these distributed ledgers were accessed by Internet users with
no specific permissions, companies have since then successfully deployed other instances in a consortium
context, restricting the task of deciding blocks to a set of n (among others) carefully selected institutions
with appropriate permissions.
For the distributed computing community, a blockchain may seem like the application of classical state
machine replication [14], where processes can be Byzantine [12], to the cryptocurrency context. A major
distinction between blockchain and state machine replication is, however, the relation between consecutive
consensus instances. A blockchain requires each of its consensus instances to be explicitly related to the
previous one. To be decided, a block proposed in consensus instance number x must embed the hash of
the block decided at instance number (x− 1). By contrast, the classical state machine replication simply
concatenates consensus instances one after the other without relating the input of a consensus instance to
the previous consensus instance : the result of a command may depend on the previous commands, but not
the fact that it can be applied.
This relation between instances is interesting as it entails a natural mechanism during a consensus ins-
tance for discarding fake proposals or, instead, considering that a proposal is valid and could potentially be
decided. Provided that processes have a copy of the blockchain and the hashing function, they can locally
evaluate whether each new block they receive is a valid candidate for a consensus instance : they simply
have to re-hash a block and compare the result to the hash embedded in the new proposed block. If the
two hashes differ, the new block is considered an invalid proposal and is simply ignored. If the hashes are
identical, then the block could potentially be decided. (Whether this block is eventually decided depends
on additional well-formedness properties of the block and the execution of the consensus instance.) This
validity generalizes common definitions of Byzantine consensus, that either assume that no value proposed
only by Byzantine processes can be decided [6], or, in the case where not all non-faulty processes propose
the same value, that any value can be decided (i.e., possibly a value proposed by a Byzantine process) [7].
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As it is impossible to solve consensus in asynchronous message-passing systems where even a single
process may crash (unexpected premature stop) [8], it follows that it is also impossible to solve this ge-
neralized definition of consensus. We propose a reduction of the problem of blockchain consensus to the
Byzantine binary consensus that works in an asynchronous model. This reduction is similar to the reduc-
tion from asynchronous secure computation [2] with explicit validation. When combined with our binary
consensus [5], it offers a blockchain consensus with no randomization, no leader, and no signatures. The
reduction spawns concurrent instances of racing reliable broadcast followed by racing binary consensus : It
only waits for the fastest of the concurrent reliable broadcast instances to terminate before spawning binary
consensus instances. As it assumes t < n/3, where n is the number of processes and t is an upper bound on
the number of faulty processes, this reduction is resilience optimal. While our consensus is presented for n
permitted processes, its blockchain could be publicly readable by more processes.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the blockchain consensus problem. Section 4 presents
the reduction of blockchain consensus to binary consensus.
2 Model
The system is made up of a set Π of n asynchronous sequential processes, namely Π = {p1, . . . , pn} ; i
is called the “index” of pi. “Asynchronous” means that each process proceeds at its own speed, which can
vary with time and remains unknown to the other processes. “Sequential” means that a process executes
one step at a time. This does not prevent it from executing several threads with an appropriate multiplexing.
Both notations i ∈ Y and pi ∈ Y are used to say that pi belongs to the set Y .
The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an asynchronous reliable point-to-point
network. “Asynchronous” means that there is no bound on message transfer delays, but these delays are
finite. “Reliable” means that the network does not lose, duplicate, modify, or create messages. “Point-to-
point” means that any pair of processes is connected by a bidirectional channel. Hence, when a process
receives a message, it can identify its sender. A process pi sends a message to a process p j by invoking the
primitive “send TAG(m) to p j”, where TAG is the type of the message and m its content. To simplify the
presentation, it is assumed that a process can send messages to itself. A process pi receives a message by
executing the primitive “receive()”. The macro-operation broadcast TAG(m) is used as a shortcut for “for
each pi ∈Π do send TAG(m) to p j end for”.
Up to t processes can exhibit a Byzantine behavior. A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbi-
trarily : it can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary state,
perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior is called faulty. Other-
wise, it is non-faulty.
Reliable broadcast in Byzantine systems RB-broadcast [1] is a one-shot one-to-all communication abs-
traction, which provides processes with two operations denoted RB broadcast() and RB deliver(). When
pi invokes the operation RB broadcast() (resp., RB deliver()), we say that it “RB-broadcasts” a message
(resp., “RB-delivers” a message). An RB-broadcast instance, where process px is the sender, is defined by
the following properties.
— RB-Validity. If a non-faulty process RB-delivers a message m from a non-faulty process px, then px
RB-broadcast m.
— RB-Unicity. A non-faulty process RB-delivers at most one message from px.
— RB-Termination-1. If px is non-faulty and RB-broadcasts a message m, all the non-faulty processes
eventually RB-deliver m from px.
— RB-Termination-2. If a non-faulty process RB-delivers a message m from px (possibly faulty) then
all the non-faulty processes eventually RB-deliver the same message m from px.
3 The Blockchain Byzantine Consensus
As in all message-passing consensus algorithms, it is assumed (in both the multivalued and binary consen-
sus algorithms presented below) that all non-faulty processes propose a value.
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Multivalued Byzantine consensus with predicate-based validity In this paper we consider an adapta-
tion of the classical Byzantine consensus problem to Blockchain. Note that an important novelty is that
a decided value does not have to be one of the proposed value. As its validity requirement relies on an
application-specific valid() predicate to indicate whether a value is valid, we call this problem the Validity
Predicate-based Byzantine Consensus (denoted VPBC) and define it as follows. Assuming that each non-
faulty process proposes a valid value, each of them has to decide on a value in such a way that the following
properties are satisfied. †
— VPBC-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a value.
— VPBC-Agreement. No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
— VPBC-Validity. A decided value is valid, it satisfies the predefined predicate denoted valid().
This definition generalizes the classical definition of Byzantine consensus, which does not include the
predicate valid().
Binary Byzantine consensus validity The validity property of the underlying binary Byzantine consen-
sus is the following : if all non-faulty processes propose the same value, no other value can be decided.
4 From Multivalued Blockchain Consensus to Binary Consensus
This section describes a reduction of multivalued blockchain Byzantine consensus to the binary By-
zantine consensus similar to the reduction from asynchronous secure computation [2] but with an explicit
validation, and based on the RB-broadcast communication abstraction and underlying instances of binary
Byzantine consensus. Let BBC denote the computational power needed to solve binary Byzantine consen-
sus. Hence, the “multivalued to binary” reduction works in the model (Section 2) when t < n/3 and BBC is
provided, denoted by BAM P n,t [t < n/3,BBC], which is resilience optimal.
Binary consensus objects. The
operation mv propose(vi) is
(01) RB broadcast VAL(vi) ;
(02) repeat if
(
∃ k : proposalsi[k] 6=⊥∧ (BINC[k].bin propose() not invoked)
)
(03) then invoke BINC[k].bin propose(1) end if ;
(04) until (∃` : bin decisionsi[`] = 1) end repeat ;
(05) for each k such that BINC[k].bin propose() not yet invoked
(06) do invoke BINC[k].bin propose(0) end for ;
(07) wait until (
∧
1≤x≤n bin decisionsi[x] 6=⊥) ;
(08) j←min{x such that bin decisionsi[x] = 1} ;
(09) wait until (proposalsi[ j] 6=⊥) ;
(10) return(proposalsi[ j]).
(11) when VAL(v) is RB-delivered from p j do if valid(v) then proposalsi[ j]← v.
(12) when BINC[k].bin propose() returns a value b do bin decisionsi[k]← b.
FIGURE 1: From multivalued to binary Byzantine consensus in
BAM P n,t [t < n/3,BBC]
processes cooperate with an ar-
ray of binary Byzantine consensus
objects denoted BINC[1..n]. The
instance BINC[k] allows the non-
faulty processes to find an agree-
ment on the value proposed by pk.
This object is implemented with
the binary Byzantine consensus al-
gorithm presented in [5]. To sim-
plify the presentation, we consi-
der that a process pi launches
its participation in BINC[k] by
invoking BINC[k].bin propose(v),
where v ∈ {0,1}. Then, it executes
the corresponding code in a speci-
fic thread, which eventually returns the value decided by BINC[k].
Local variables. Each process pi manages the following local variables ; ⊥ denotes a default value that
cannot be proposed by a (faulty or non-faulty) process : An array proposalsi[1..n] initialized to [⊥, · · · ,⊥].
The aim of proposalsi[ j] is to contain the value proposed by p j. An array bin decisionsi[1..n] initialized to
[⊥, · · · ,⊥]. The aim of bin decisionsi[k] is to contain the value (0 or 1) decided by the binary consensus
object BINC[k].
The algorithm. The algorithm reducing multivalued Byzantine consensus to binary Byzantine consensus is
described in Figure 1. In this algorithm, a process invokes the operation mv propose(v), where v is the value
it proposes to the multivalued consensus. The behavior of a process pi can be decomposed into four phases.
Phase 1 : pi disseminates its value (lines 01 and 11). A process pi first sends its value to all the processes
†. Note that our consensus definition decouples the validity of a value from the nature (faulty or non-faulty) of the process pro-
posing it. We assume that every non-faulty process proposes a valid value for the sake of simplicity. However, if we assume that the
Byzantine behavior of a process is related only to its code and not to its input value (which is application-dependent), our algorithm
remains correct as long as at least one non-faulty process proposes a valid value.
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by invoking the RB-broadcast operation (line 01). When a process RB-delivers the value v RB-broadcast
by a process p j, it stores it in proposalsi[ j] if v is valid (line 11).
Phase 2 : pi starts participating in a first set of binary consensus instances (lines 02-04). Then, pi enters a
loop in which it starts participating in the binary consensus instances BINC[k], to which it proposes the value
1, associated with each process pk from which it has RB-delivered the proposed value (lines 02-03). This
loop stops as soon as pi discovers a binary consensus instance BINC[`] in which 1 was decided (line 04).
Phase 3 : pi starts participating in all other binary consensus instances (lines 05-06). After it knows a binary
consensus instance decided 1, pi invokes bin propose(0) on all the binary consensus instances BINC[k] in
which it has not yet participated. Let us notice that it is possible that, for some of these instances BINC[k], no
process has RB-delivered a value from the associated process pk. The aim of these consensus participations
is to ensure that all binary consensus instances eventually terminate.
Phase 4 : pi decides a value (lines 07-10 and 12). Finally pi considers the first (according to the process
index order) among the successful binary consensus objects, i.e., the ones that returned 1 (line 08). ‡ Let
BINC[ j] be this binary consensus object. As the associated decided value is 1, at least one non-faulty process
proposed 1, which means that it RB-delivered a value from the process p j (lines 02-03). Let us observe that,
due to the RB-Termination-2 property, this value is eventually RB-delivered by every non-faulty process.
Consequently, pi decides it (lines 09-10).
5 Related Work
Our validated predicate-based consensus differs from previous definitions in the way validity is defined.
The seminal paper on the agreement between Byzantine generals considers a single source ; its validity
requires that if the source proposes only one value, then only this value can be decided [12]. In the case
where multiple, potentially Byzantine, processes propose values, validity often requires that if all non-faulty
processes propose the same value then this value should be decided [7]. The classic validity used in the
crash model is sometimes used in the Byzantine model requiring that a decided value is proposed by some
process [4] but the notion of valid value proposed by a Byzantine process can be unclear. A predicate was
previously used to assess whether a value is valid, however, the resulting predicate-based validity requires
that if all non-faulty processes propose the same valid value then this value should be decided [10]. A variant
requires the decided value to be value that was proposed [3]. When values are not necessarily binary, the
decided value may either be a special value ⊥ or a value proposed by a non-faulty process [6]. As ⊥ is a
predefined value, deciding this value is similar to aborting [9]. Our validity property allows for a valid value
proposed only by Byzantine processes to be decided rather than aborting.
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